LETTER FROM LONDON
What
comes after UKIP?
The
Euroskeptics’ secret post-referendum plan for the party.
By MATTHEW GOODWIN
3/28/16, 6:23 AM CET Updated 3/28/16, 10:06 AM CET
LONDON — Britain
could vote to remain in the EU but face an altogether new rebellion
afterwards.
That is the hope of
some of Britain’s most senior Euroskeptics who are already making
plans for what could happen in the event that they fail to fulfill
their dream of a Brexit. Though opinion polls suggest the race is
neck-and-neck — the current “poll of polls” puts Remain on 51
percent and Leave on 49 percent — some of the most influential
voices in the Brexit camp are already exploring how to continue their
fight should they be defeated on June 23.
Amid a Euroskeptic
movement divided into warring factions, influential campaigners and
donors are beginning to talk openly about how — should they lose —
they could emerge from defeat with a new movement that has much
broader appeal. Those around the UK Independence Party (UKIP) have
been inspired in part by the Scottish National Party (SNP) that
despite experiencing defeat at the 2014 referendum went on to force a
complete realignment of politics in Scotland in the 2015 general
election.
Influential
campaigners and donors are beginning to talk openly about how —
should they lose — they could emerge from defeat with a new
movement that has much broader appeal.
Those who talk about
trying to emulate the Scottish model also share an awareness that in
its current form UKIP, which mobilized 13 percent of the vote at that
same general election, has taken Euroskeptics as far as they can go.
Pointing to how the party has continued to tread water at between 10
and 15 percent in opinion polls, some of the most senior donors and
strategists are now actively talking about how to use Britain’s EU
referendum as a springboard to launch a more professional successor
movement that can reach the 20-25 percent territory.
As one of Britain’s
most senior Euroskeptics told me: “UKIP needs to rebrand itself and
change after the referendum. There is a huge opportunity coming. You
could have that SNP effect where you lose the battle but win the war.
I am keen to look at how we can reposition UKIP to take full
advantage of that.”
Some point to the
sheer quantity of data that Brexiteers will hold after the referendum
— detailed information on hundreds of thousands of voters who have
either registered their support for Euroskeptic platforms or voted
for UKIP during a succession of national election campaigns.
Leave.EU, an organization with close ties to UKIP, now has 600,000
fans on Facebook, more than the Conservative Party, Labour, Liberal
Democrats and UKIP. It is also revealing that they are now employing
the same social media analytical teams that are scraping data for Ted
Cruz and others in the United States.
UKIP needs to
rebrand itself and change after the referendum. There is a huge
opportunity coming — senior British Euroskeptic
One idea floating
around is to remodel the 23-year-old UKIP, currently third in the
polls, along the lines of the populist Beppe Grillo’s Five Star
Movement in Italy. Instead of a conventional branch-based model,
supporters would be organized around “online democracy” and given
far more power than UKIP members currently hold. Whether Nigel
Farage, who has long held a tight grip over his party, would be
content with such a set-up or even be involved is unclear. Either
way, prominent Euroskeptics talk of wanting to build a younger, more
active support base. “UKIP is seen as an old people’s party,”
said one influential donor, “whereas most of the opposition to the
EU on the continent is younger.” There is some truth to this.
Unlike the ‘Freedom Parties’ in Austria and the Netherlands, both
of which are currently sitting comfortably in first place in the
polls, or the National Front in France, which is gearing up for the
2017 presidential campaign, UKIP has made little headway among
middle-aged and younger voters. Nor has it emulated Marine Le Pen’s
inroads among women.
There is also no
doubt that Britain’s current political climate would be receptive
to a broader movement anchored in cultural conservatism, even if the
country votes to remain in the EU. Beneath the specific referendum
question lie deeper currents that have been eroding loyalty to the
main parties.
Over the past 50
years the proportion of voters who feel only weakly attached or not
attached at all to Labour and the Conservatives has surged from one
in five to more than one in two. Britain has become less welcoming to
the old parties and more open to new ones.
Beneath the specific
referendum question lie deeper currents that have been eroding
loyalty to the main parties.
Last year Cameron
secured a surprise majority but once you account for turnout his
power rests on support from just one in four adults — hardly a
compelling mandate. Meanwhile, 25 percent of those who went to the
polls voted for somebody other than the Conservatives, Labour or
Liberal Democrats — the highest figure on record. The collapse of
the Liberal Democrats, who show no sign of recovery, further pushes
open space for an anti-Westminster alternative.
It is easy to spot
cultural concerns, too. Since Cameron’s reelection last May, public
unease over immigration has reached record levels. For nine
consecutive months voters have identified this issue as among the
most important facing Britain. Today a striking 47 percent rate
immigration or race as the most pressing concern — it is
comfortably in first place, 10 points ahead of healthcare and 24
points ahead of the economy.
Regardless of the
referendum result British society is dominated by intense public
angst over national identity and borders. Cultural anxieties now
trump economics, a reality underscored daily by new public fears over
the role of Turkey and Islam in Europe, the refugee crisis and
national security.
That these issues
hold the potential to further expand support for Europe’s radical
right can be seen in the Netherlands and Hungary, where a cultural
narrative focused on the defense of Western values is cementing
support for Geert Wilders and Viktor Orbán.
Britain’s
blue-collar workers have long felt economically left behind by
globalization and cut adrift from the established parties that
overlooked them in favor of the professional middle-classes
These openings are
distinctly unlikely to evaporate were Britain to remain in the EU.
Why would they? If anything it is already possible to identify voters
who will continue to feel profoundly anxious over the direction of
British society.
On the right,
Euroskeptic social conservatives will feel betrayed by Britain’s
decision to remain and by Cameron who unlike a majority of his
supporters is campaigning against Brexit. In polls, typically 48
percent of Conservative Party voters and 60 percent of Conservative
Party members back Brexit. There is no reason why, after a Remain
vote, these older voters, many of whom will have already voted for
UKIP in local or European elections, will suddenly drop their
opposition to the EU, free movement and concern that net migration
into Britain has now surpassed a record 300,000. For Cameron and his
successor, the challenge of keeping disgruntled Tories in the
Conservative tent is about to reach all new heights.
Meanwhile, on the
left the picture is similar. After the referendum manual workers who
share this Euroskepticism are likely to feel even more disconnected
from middle-class Labour politicians who will have spent the
referendum campaign praising the exact things that make these
struggling voters feel so under threat — European integration, a
global market, free movement and rapid social change. As elsewhere in
Europe, Britain’s blue-collar workers have long felt economically
left behind by globalization and cut adrift from the established
parties that overlooked them in favour of the professional
middle-classes. And like social democrats across the continent,
Labour is feeling the full force of this disconnect.
Over the past 20
years the percentage of working-class Britons who reject the idea
they are represented by Labour has rocketed, from 7 to 30 percent.
This growing dissatisfaction helps to explain why, by 2015, it was
UKIP not Labour that held the most working-class electorate in
British politics.
Across Europe this
combination of social conservatives, insecure lower middle-class,
self-employed and blue-collar workers propelled populist forces —
from the Danish People’s Party to the French National Front —
into positions of serious influence. Meanwhile it is often social
democrats, having failed to offer workers a convincing reply to their
identity concerns, who are the biggest losers, as we saw again in
recent elections in Germany.
The slow decline of
Britain’s center-left translates into the biggest opening for a new
movement since the initial breakthrough of Labour in the 1920s.
In Britain it could
have been even worse for Labour. While Farage talked of “parking
his tanks on Labour’s lawn,” UKIP embraced the free market while
its libertarian leanings fueled accusations that it wanted to
privatize the National Health Service, an institution cherished by
the working-class. Unlike the economic protectionism espoused by,
say, Le Pen, this prevented UKIP from mobilizing its full support
among the working-classes. Were the new movement to press the same
buttons as radical right parties in other European states —
populist attacks against banks, tax evaders, corporate cartels and
the excesses of globalization — then it could be a very different
story.
Today blue-collar
voters who last year failed to rally behind Labour show little
appetite for Jeremy Corbyn, already the most unpopular opposition
leader in recent history. The slow decline of Britain’s center-left
translates into the biggest opening for a new movement since the
initial breakthrough of Labour in the 1920s.
People often argue
that Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system offers
protection from the much larger populist and radical right revolts
that are engulfing Europe. But this ignores the deeper shifts that
are making such a realignment look increasingly possible. For these
reasons it could be only a matter of time until the secretive plans
to build a new populist army translate into a far more impressive
breakthrough.
Matthew Goodwin is
professor of politics and international relations at the University
of Kent and a senior fellow at Chatham House.
Authors:
Matthew Goodwin
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