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A Teutonic union. Behind the scenes, Germany quietly asserts its influence in Brussels. The Economist.



A Teutonic union

Behind the scenes, Germany quietly asserts its influence in Brussels

Sep 13th 2014 | From the print edition


THE European Union, it is often said, long served to disguise both French weakness and German strength. It magnified France’s unabashed pursuit of its national interests and allowed Germany to pretend it did not have any. But the euro crisis has shifted power decisively to Angela Merkel’s Germany, dispelling the illusion. The recent allocation of top jobs may have killed it.

This is not apparent at first glance. No German has secured a big post (barring Martin Schulz, who stays as president of the European Parliament). This week Jean-Claude Juncker, the incoming president of the European Commission, doled out various jobs to the individuals nominated by their national governments. Günther Oettinger, the German, was put in charge of the “digital economy and society”: hardly a dazzling portfolio for a man from the club’s largest and richest member (although, of course, Mr Juncker insists that commissioners leave their passports at the door). Mr Oettinger’s work will also be overseen by a vice-president: Andrus Ansip, from tiny Estonia.

But German influence may be detected in subtler form. The best example is the economic and financial affairs commissioner. Since the euro crisis erupted it has fallen to this person to act as a fiscal watchdog, telling off euro-zone countries who fail to abide by their budget commitments. The job has been performed with gusto by two austere Finns who have held the post since 2010, acting, says one official, “as surrogate Germans”.

This year the French government, no friend of austerity, lobbied hard to get the post for Pierre Moscovici, who served as France’s finance minister between 2012 and 2014. Mrs Merkel was horrified by the idea of putting the fox in charge of the chickens. But after much jostling, Mr Moscovici got the job, only to find that his work will be overseen by two hawkish vice-presidents, including one of his Finnish predecessors, Jyrki Katainen. Mr Moscovici gets on well with Mr Juncker, and it remains to be seen if the new structure will work. But he will need to display a hitherto unseen wiliness if he is to operate independently. An early test will be dealing with his own country, which hours before Mr Juncker’s announcement said it would fall far short of the budget-deficit targets it had agreed with the commission.

Mr Juncker, who has plenty of critics, made clear this week that he will be his own man. His appointments contained several surprises. Vowing to “shake things up”, he unveiled a new structure that comes close to eliminating the fiction that all 28 commissioners (and countries) are equal. Seven vice-presidents have been given cross-cutting roles to ensure policy co-ordination; one, the Netherlands’ Frans Timmermans, will be a primus inter pares, charged also with ensuring the commission does not meddle in matters best left to national governments. Not all Mr Juncker’s changes will be to Mrs Merkel’s taste.

And yet the broader picture looks German-friendly. The commission has a distinctly more liberal tilt than its recent predecessors, with Nordics in charge of such important portfolios as trade and competition. The decision to place Jonathan Hill, the British commissioner, in charge of financial services has outraged banker-bashers in the European Parliament, among others. But it will stem the slow drifting apart of the ins and outs of the euro zone, and it should strengthen the hand of those in the British government who want accommodation with the EU rather than separation from it. Both shifts will please Mrs Merkel.

The Germans have done well elsewhere, too. At the EU summit on August 30th Donald Tusk, Poland’s prime minister and a firm ally of Mrs Merkel, was installed as president of the European Council. (He speaks fluent German but no French.) The appointment, at the same meeting, of Federica Mogherini, the inexperienced Italian foreign minister, as the EU’s high representative for foreign policy is no real threat to German interests. Mrs Merkel helped to engineer the choice of Luis de Guindos, Spain’s reforming and deficit-cutting finance minister, as chairman of the eurogroup, where finance ministers from euro countries meet.

Perhaps most tellingly, the Germans have acquired a better understanding of the low-profile but high-impact jobs in which Brussels specialises. Inside the increasingly assertive European Parliament, the secretary-general, Klaus Welle, a man with a penchant for loud check suits, has emerged as a powerful figure. Like Martin Selmayr, Mr Juncker’s scheming chief of staff, he belongs to Mrs Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). According to some accounts, one of the thorniest tasks for Mr Juncker’s team was to ensure that enough posts in commissioners’ cabinets (private offices) were doled out to members of the CDU or its allies.

Mrs Merkel is often helped by the missteps of Europe’s other big countries. François Hollande’s brush with record low approval ratings at home has accelerated the decline of French influence in Brussels, even if it began long before he took office. Britain, run by a Eurosceptic prime minister whose party toys with the idea of leaving the EU altogether, is a much weaker voice. Italy’s prime minister, Matteo Renzi, spent vast amounts of political capital (and irritated several colleagues) to secure Ms Mogherini’s position, to no obvious Italian advantage.

Choose your battles
Not every battle will be won inside a complex bureaucracy of 28 countries and all manner of institutional arcana. But German diplomacy within Europe is driven by one overriding concern: to hold the fiscal line against calls for a more expansive approach. Murmurs of opposition to it are growing all round the continent. If France or Italy ever get serious about structural reforms, the balance of opinion may start to turn against Mrs Merkel. But after the developments of the past few weeks, she will at least find the machinery of Brussels friendlier than ever.

Economist.com/blogs/charlemagne

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